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I. INTRODUCTION 
"There is considerable reason to believe that the civil justice 
system has substantial, underutilized potential in the war 
. . ,J 
agaznst terrorzsm. 
John Norton Moore 
The central consequence of the 2001 al-Qa'eda terror 
attack2 on the United States of America was a fundamental 
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1 JOHN NORTON MOORE, Introduction, in CIVIL LITIGATION AGAINST 
TERRORISM 3, 5 (John Norton Moore ed., Carolina Academic Press 2004). 
2 U.S. H. PERMANENT SELECT COMM., AL-QAEDA: THE MANY 
FACES OF AN ISLAMIST EXTREMIST THREAT, H.R. REP. No. 109-615, at 8 
(2006) . AI-Qaeda finds its roots in the Salafi tradition, which is based on 
the extreme interpretation of Sunni Islam. !d. "Salafism is rooted in the 
belief that the Koran and the teachings of the Prophet Muhammad and his 
5 
6 Trends and Issues in Terrorism and the Law Vol.5 
legal shift in the approach that the United States and, to a 
lesser degree, other democratic nations3 have taken in regard 
to confronting international terrorism and the States that 
support terrorism.4 Damaged was the old law enforcement 
paradigm of pre-9111 which emphasized international treaties 
focused entirely on criminalizing specific acts of terror by 
specific individuals.5 The new challenge of the post-9/11 
companions are the most legitimate sources of religious conduct and 
reasoning, and as such should be emulated and put into practice in 
contemporary Islamic communities." /d. Al-Qaeda has used this distorted 
interpretation of Salafi Islam to attract thousands of Muslims around the 
world to wage a war against the United States and the West. /d. 
3 Democracy's Decline: Cryingfor Freedom , ECONOMIST, Jan. 16, 
2010, at 58-60. According to the lobby group Freedom House, the number 
of electoral democracies in the world stands at 116 out of the 192 nations 
in the United Nations. /d. 
4 JEFFREY F. ADDICOTT, TERRORISM LAW: MATERIALS, CASES, 
COMMENTS 19-54 (5th ed. , Lawyers & Judges Publishing Co. 2009) 
(describing the concept of the "War on Terror" and how America has 
shifted to the law of war in dealing with the radical al-Qa'eda group). 
5 /d. at 59. 
Some examples of specific antiterrorist conventions 
include: The Convention on Offenses and Certain Other 
Acts Committed on Board Aircraft (Tokyo Convention, 
1963); Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful 
Seizure of Aircraft (Hague Convention, 1971); 
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts 
Against the Safety of Civil Aviation (Montreal 
Convention, 1973); Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected 
Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents (New York 
Convention, 1976- I 977); and the International 
Convention Against the Taking of Hostages (Hostages 
Convention, 1979). /d. International Convention for 
the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings ( 1997); 
International Convention for the Suppression of the 
Financing of Terrorism (1999); International 
Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear 
Terrorism New York (2005); Convention on the 
Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of 
Detection (1991); Protocol for the Suppression of 
Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms 
Located on the Continental Shelf (1988); Convention 
for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety 
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approach focuses on ways to effectively combat not only the 
al-Qa'eda-styled Islamic terrorists and groups, but the States 
that provide sponsorship or support to all forms of 
international terrorism, particularly the mega-Islamic terror 
groups.6 Apart from activities associated with killing, 
detaining, or prosecuting individual terrorists-whether they 
are labeled as enemy combatants or not 7-this new thinking 
also demands the acceptance by fellow democracies of an 
internationally based functional legal methodology that can 
deter those rogue States that sponsor terrorism, like Iran, ab 
. . . 8 
mltw. 
In the United States, the new thinking by both the 
Executive and Congress encompassed the employment of a 
"law of war" model against a specific terror group- al-
Qa'eda and their supporters, the Taliban. This model used the 
of Maritime Navigation (1988); Protocol on the 
Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports 
Serving International Ci vii Aviation (1988); Convention 
on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (1980); 
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts 
against the Safety of Civil Aviation (1971). 
U.N.T.S. , Text and Status of the United Nations Convention on Terrorism, 
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/DB.aspx?path=DB/studies/page2_en.xml&me 
nu=MTDSG (last visited June 10, 2010). 
6 U.S. Dep't of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 
Foreign Terrorist Organizations (Jan. 19, 2010), available at 
http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm. Hamas and Hezbollah 
have long been on the State Department 's list of terror organizations. /d. 
7 Jeffrey F. Addicott, Efficacy of the Obama Policies to Combat Al-
Qa 'eda, the Taliban, and Associated Forces- The First Year, 30 PACE L. 
REV. 340, 350 (2010). The term "War on Terror" was used by the Bush 
Administration to describe the ongoing international armed conflict 
between the United States of America and the "Taliban, al-Qa'eda, or 
associated forces ." !d. at 345-46. The Obama Administration generally 
refuses to use the term "War on Terror" but operates under the same legal 
authorities." /d. at 353. 
8 Debra M. Strauss, Reaching Out to the International Community: 
Civil Lawsuits as the Common Ground in the Battle Against Terrorism, 
19 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 307 (2009) (arguing for a new legal 
framework to combat terrorism based on civil litigation). 
8 Trends and Issues in Terrorism and the Law Vol.5 
more robust tool of militar6' force9 against all those "nations, 
organizations, or persons"1 that the President determined had 
"planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist 
attacks" 11 against the United States on September 11, 2001. 
While other States around the world did not use a law of war 
model to deal with al-Qa'eda or similar terror groups, the rise 
of the mega-Islamic terror groups did prompt them to alter 
their domestic criminal statutes. England, for example, 
amended its criminal code to allow for the detention of 
suspected "terrorists" for up to 28 days without bringing 
criminal charges. 12 This was done to provide law 
enforcement the legal right to stop and hold those suspected 
of planning a terror plot even if the hard evidence was 
lacking at the time of detention. 
Although much has been written on the legal and policy 
issues surrounding the use of the law of war as a legitimate 
tool against certain terror groups, perhaps the best weapon 
against international terrorism, civil litigation against the 
State that sponsors or supports terrorism is still an emerging 
concept. 13 Given the fact that large scale terror groups like 
9 Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 
2600 (2006). "An Act to authorize trial by military commission for 
violations of the law of war, and for other purposes." /d. The United 
States also used other law of war tools such as trial by military 
commissions to prosecute alleged war criminals associated with al-Qa'eda 
and Tali ban forces for violations of the law of war. /d. at 2601. See also 
Military Commissions Act of2009, H.R. REP. NO. 2647-385, at 386 
(2009). 
10 Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 
Stat. 224 (2001). 
II /d. 
12 Terrorism Act 2006 (U.K.), available at 
http://www.opsi.gov. uk/acts/acts2006/ukpga _ 200600 11_ en _1. "An Act 
to make provision for and about offences relating to conduct carried out, 
or capable of being carried out, for purposes connected with terrorism; to 
amend enactments relating to terrorism; to amend the Intelligence 
Services Act 1994 and the Regulation oflnvestigatory Powers Act 2000; 
and for connected purposes." /d. 
13 Jack D. Smith & Gregory J. Cooper, Disrupting Terrorist 
Financing with Civil Litigation, 41 CASE W. REs. J. INT'LL. 65 (2009) 
(discussing the development of the concept of civil litigation and the 
promise of disrupting terrorism). 
2010 Civil Judgments to Deter State Terrorism Sponsors 9 
Bezbollah, al-Qa'eda, or Barnas cannot operate effectively 
without State sponsorship, the purpose of this article is to 
discuss the acceptance by the world's democratic nations of 
this potentially superlative legal tool which could be used 
with great effect not only to deter the terrorism, but to totally 
eviscerate many of the most visible terror groups such as 
Barnas and Bezbollah. In other words, apart from what any 
particular State may or may not do to address terrorism as a 
criminal or law of war issue, one response that the terrorist 
group and, more importantly, the State that sponsors or 
supports the terrorist group, will always understand is 
targeting and draining its financial assets. Recognizing that 
the "democracies of the world are fmancial and economic 
superpowers" 14 that actually control large chunks of 
economic capital from all nations, a legal avenue for victims 
of terror to receive compensation via civil litigation would 
serve as a vital and necessary means to deny resources to 
terrorist organizations and at the same time punish the State-
sponsor. Such a legal tool would certainly act as a powerful 
deterrence against those nations who sponsor terrorist groups 
by making it "unprofitable to engage in support of terrorist 
activities." 15 
Unfortunately, while the United States has established 
several legal avenues for civil litigation by private citizens of 
terror attacks against States that sponsor terrorism, a major 
stumbling block in terms of effectiveness rests in the reality 
that fellow democratic nations in the international community 
refuse to honor or domesticate the monetary judgments of 
American courts. Acknowledging that there are a plethora of 
political and legal obstacles associated with establishing a 
workable mechanism for fellow democracies to enforce the 
"terror" judgments of American courts, one reason that is 
often raised by critics is the strong objection to the matter of 
14 JOHN NORTON MOORE, Civil Litigation Against Terrorism: 
Neglected Promise, in LEGAL ISSUES IN THE STRUGGLE AGAINST TERROR 
197,200 (John Norton Moore & Robert F. Turner eds., Carolina 
Academic Press 2010). 
15 JOHN F. MURPHY, Civil Lawsuits as a Legal Response to 
International Terrorism, in CrviL LITIGATION AGAINST TERRORISM 37, 61 
(John Norton Moore ed., Carolina Academic Press 2004). 
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American pumtlve monetary awards, a concept that is 
rejected by most of the world's democratic legal systems. The 
answer to the aversion towards punitive damages can be 
remedied by substituting the more widespread acceptance of 
compensatory damages. Accordingly, any future effort to 
establish a legal framework to energize democracies to 
enforce American judgments should be predicated solely on 
compensation. Hopefully, as more nations come to 
understand the American concept of just compensation, the 
establishment of a viable international agreement will occur. 
II. TERRORISM 
It is sometimes said that terrorism is a mindless and 
irrational activity. This conclusion is absolutely false. The 
reality of modern terrorism is the exact opposite. Terrorism 
is the premeditated use of unlawful violence calculated to, as 
the old Chinese saw relates, "kill one and frighten ten 
thousand." 16 Unfortunately, all too often, this strategy of 
intimidation, death, and resulting fear used by the terrorists 
pays off when those who are attacked are perceived as 
capitulating to the terrorists' demands. The outcome of the 
elections in Spain following the 2004 train bombings in 
Madrid is a clear example of how the actions of terrorists can 
cause the citizens of a target nation to acquiesce to the 
demands of terrorists. 17 
Perhaps the greatest inadequacy of the international 
community in terms of dealing with terrorism rests in an 
inability to agree as to what constitutes terrorism. Radical 
Islamic terrorism is a global problem and yet the international 
community has been absolutely unable to adopt an accepted 
international definition of terrorism. Even the former 
Secretary General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan's, 2005 
definition was rejected because a large block of Islamic 
16 See SUN-TZU, THE ARTOFW AR (Ralph D. Sawyer, trans., 1994). 
17 Human Rights Watch , Setting an Example? Counter-Terrorism 
Measures in Spain, 16-17, available at 
http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2005/0l/26/setting-example-O (2005) . 
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nations wanted an exception for wars of nationalliberation. 18 
Ignoring the "cause," Annan's entirely reasonable definition 
echoed the Geneva Conventions,t 9 definition of a war crime. 
"[A]ny action constitutes terrorism if it is intended to cause 
death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants, 
with the purpose of intimidating a population or compelling a 
Government or an international organization to do or abstain 
from doing any act." 
Like other nations around the world, the United States has 
developed its own definitions regarding terrorism. In fact, 
there are a number of domestic definitions of terrorism that 
can be found in various federal criminal statutes and 
legislation. 20 The most recent effort to define terrorism IS 
18 Serge Schmemann, Man in the News; UN's Candid Reshaper--
Kofi Atta Annan, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2001, available at 
http://www .nytimes.com/200 Ill 0/13/international/13ANNA.html. 
19 !d. The central international treaty dealing with the law of war or 
the law of armed conflict is the 1949 Geneva Convention. International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), The Geneva Conventions of 1949, 
available at 
http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteengO.nsf/htmllgenevaconventions 
(2009). The Geneva Conventions are set out in four categories: (1) 
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the 
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 
U.N.T.S. 31; (2) Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the 
Condition of the Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of Armed 
Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 ; (3) Geneva Convention 
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949,75 
U.N.T.S. 135 ; and (4) Geneva Convention Relative to the Protections of 
Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949,75 U.N.T.S. 287. !d. 
20 See, e.g., 28 C.F.R. §0.85 (2010) (asserting that there are 
numerous Federal statutes that offer slightly different definitions of 
terrorism). The Department of Justice defines terrorism as "the unlawful 
use of force and violence against persons or property to intimidate or 
coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in 
furtherance of political or social objectives." !d. 
(1) the term "international terrorism" means activities 
that-
( A) involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life 
that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United 
States or of any State, or that would be a criminal 
violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the 
United States or of any State; 
12 Trends and Issues in Terrorism and the Law Vol.5 
found at § 411 of the Uniting and Strengthening America by 
Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and 
Obstruct Terrorism (hereinafter "USA/PATRIOT Act") Act 
of 2001,21 which provides definitions for "terrorist 
organization," "domestic terrorism," and "international 
terrorism."22 A terrorist organization is defined as one that is: 
(1) Designated by the Secretary of State as a 
terrorist organization under the process 
established under current law; 
(2) Designated by the Secretary of State as a 
terrorist organization for immigration 
purposes; or 
(3) A group of two or more individuals that 
commits terrorist act1v1t1es or plans or 
prepares to commit (including locating targets 
for) terrorist activities.'m 
International terrorism is set out in the Act as follows: 
International terrorism involves violent acts or 
acts dangerous to human life that violate the 
(B) appear to be intended-
(i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; 
(ii) to influence the policy of a government by 
intimidation or coercion; or 
(iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass 
destruction, assassination, or kidnapping; and 
(C) occur primarily outside the territorial jurisdiction of 
the United States, or transcend national boundaries in 
terms of the means by which they are accomplished, the 
persons they appear intended to intimidate or coerce, or 
the locale in which their perpetrators operate or seek 
asylum 
18 U.S.C. § 2331 (2009) (offering a slightly different definition of 
international terrorism). 
2 1 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate 
Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 [USA 
PATRIOT ACT], Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001). 
22 /d. 
23 /d. 
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criminal laws of the United States or any state, 
or that would be a criminal violation if 
committed within the jurisdiction of the 
United States or any state. These acts appear 
intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian 
population, influence the policy of a 
government by intimidation to coercion, or 
affect the conduct of a government by 
assassination or kidnapping. International 
terrorist acts occur outside the United States or 
transcend national boundaries in terms of how 
terrorists accomplish them, the persons they 
appear intended to coerce or intimidate, or the 
place in which the perpetrators operate. 24 
In summary, if the international community cannot even 
agree on how to define terrorism, it is highly unlikely that the 
United Nations will move very far or fast to develop new 
legal foundations to confront the problem head-on. Thus, it 
rests on individual democracies to craft the necessary treaties 
and agreements to move forward in the fight against 
international terrorism. 
III. UNITED STATES CIVIL LITIGATION LAW AGAINST 
TERRORISM 
American law recognizes two major types of legal 
activity in the realm of civil liability lawsuits regarding acts 
of terrorism. The first relates to so-called "premises liability" 
lawsuits which are typically brought by victims of an act of 
terrorism against an "affected target" of terrorism, e.g., a 
business entity. The second category relates to lawsuits 
directed against those individuals, groups, or States (or State 
agents) that commit, support, or sponsor a terrorist attack. 
This discussion concerns the second category of civil 
litigation. 
Monetary damages associated with civil actions against 
terrorists and their sponsors serve as a key ingredient in 
24 /d. 
14 Trends and Issues in Terrorism and the Law Vol.5 
combating international terrorism and fulfill United Nations 
Security Council Resolution 1368 (issued in the wake of the 
terror attacks of September 11, 2001): "[T]he international 
community [must] redouble their efforts to prevent and 
suppress terrorist acts . . .. "25 Even prior to the coordinated 
terror attacks of September 11, 2001, which killed 3,000 
people and caused billions of dollars in property loss, the 
United States government recognized the threat of 
international terrorism and the need to provide solid legal 
mechanisms for American terror victims to file private causes 
of action against both those who commit international acts of 
terror and those who contribute to those attacks, either 
directly or indirectly. In addition to providing an avenue for 
victims of terror to receive compensation, the United States 
also understood that civil litigation, if used effectively, would 
certainly serve as a critical and necessary means of deterrence 
against terrorist organizations as well as those nations who 
sponsor terrorist groups. For this reason, Congress expressly 
directed retroactive application of the Antiterrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (hereinafter "AEDP A"), 
8 U.S. C. § 1189, so that the law applied to any cause of 
action arising before or after the enactment of the AEDPA.26 
25 S.C. Res. 1368, <J[ 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (Sept. 12, 2001). 
"Unequivocally condemns in the strongest terms the horrifying terrorist 
attacks which took place on 11 September 2001 in New York, 
Washington, D.C. and Pennsylvania and regards such acts, like any act of 
international terrorism, as a threat to international peace and security." /d. 
at <J[ 1. 
26 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1189 
(1996). 
( 1) In general. The Secretary is authorized to designate 
an organization as a foreign terrorist organization in 
accordance with this subsection if the Secretary finds 
that-
( A) the organization is a foreign organization; 
(B) the organization engages in terrorist activity (as 
defined in section 212(a)(3)(B) [8 USCS 
§ 1182(a)(3)(B)]); and 
(C) the terrorist activity of the organization 
threatens the security of United States nationals or 
the national security of the United States. 
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In tandem with subsequent federal statutes dealing with 
terrorism civil lawsuits, this model ensures that terrorists and 
their supporters suffer significant financial punishment which 
functions both as a direct deterrence and as a disabling 
mechanism-the very core of the intent of punitive damages. 
Clearly, in the American justice system, the essence of 
punitive damages is to award the plaintiff(s) a significant 
money judgment in addition to actual damages against those 
defendants who acted with recklessness, intentional malice, 
or deceit. The wrongdoer is penalized by means of punitive 
damages in order to both deter future wrongdoing and to 
make a clear example to others.27 Nowhere is this context 
more applicable than in the sphere of curtailing international 
terrorism. Paradoxically, however, it is this provision that 
presents a stumbling block for other democracies to join as 
full partners in any agreements to honor such judgments. 
In the United States, civil litigation28 can be brought 
against one of three categories of international terrorists and 
their sponsors: (1) purely non-State actors, individuals as well 
as groups; (2) States that sponsor terrorism, or their agents 
(hereinafter "Flatow Amendment");29 or (3) State actors 
committing acts of terrorism outside of their official capacity, 
so-called non-FSIA (Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act) 
defendants.3° Currently, under American jurisprudence, two 
main federal statutory frameworks exist: (1) the Flatow 
Amendment to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 
(hereinafter "FSIA"), 28 U.S.C. § 1605; and (2) the 
Antiterrorism Act (hereinafter "ATA"), 18 U.S.C. § 2333 . 
The so-called Flatow Amendment provides that a foreign 
official of a designated State sponsor of terrorism, while 
acting within the scope of his office, can be civilly liable in 
27 See, e.g., BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 418 (8th ed. 2004). 
28 The use of civil litigation as a deterrent to the proscription of 
torture predates terrori sm. Acknowledging that the practice of torture 
would continue unless deterred, the 1984 case of Filartiga v. Pena-lrala, 
awarded punitive damages of no less than $5,000,000.00 to the father and 
sister of Joelito Filartiga, who was tortured to death by Paraguayan 
officials. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 577 F. Supp. 860 (E.D.N.Y. 1984). 
29 Judiciary & Judicial Procedure, 28 U.S.C. § 1605A (2008). 
30 !d. 
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an American court for violation of acts contained within the 
legislation. Further, as part of the 2008 Defense 
Authorization Act, 31 Congress made it crystal clear that 1996 
FSIA Amendments applied a statutory cause of action against 
the actual State that sponsored the terrorist act. 32 Similarly, 
the AT A allows for private citizens to bring lawsuits for acts 
of international terrorism with the added deterrent goal of 
making it unprofitable for terrorists to solicit or maintain 
financial assets within the United States.33 
Added to the FSIA in 1996, the Flatow Amendment is 
codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1605A, creating an exception to 
foreign sovereign immunity in civil suits "in which money 
damages are sought against a foreign state for personal injury 
or death that was caused by an act of torture, extrajudicial 
killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage taking, or the provision of 
material support or resources [as defined in section 2339A of 
Title 18] for such an act if such act or provision of material 
support is engaged in by an official, employee, or agent of 
such foreign state while acting within the scope of his or her 
office, employment, or agency"34 or other terrorist acts. 
Although this exception applies only if the defendant foreign 
State was designated as a State sponsor of terrorism at the 
time the alleged acts occurred, the issue of punitive damages 
remains in all terrorism civil lawsuits. Specifically, § 
1605A(c) authorizes the full range of money damages which 
"may include economic dama~es, solatium, pain and 
suffering, and punitive damages." 5 The Flatow Amendment 
provides that: 
A foreign state that is or was a state sponsor of 
3 1 See National Defense Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 110-181 , 
§ 1083 (2008). 
32 See Cicippio-Puleo v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 353 F.3d 1024 
(D.C. Cir. 2004). The 2008 Amendment was in response to this ruling in 
which the court held that suit could not be brought against the State. !d. at 
1036. 
33 For an excellent overview of American approaches in the law see 
National Security, 43 INT'L L. 929 (2009). 
34 Judiciary & Judicial Procedure, 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(l) (2008). 
35 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(c). 
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terrorism as described in subsection 
(a)(2)(A)(i), and any official, employee, or 
agent of that foreign state while acting within 
the scope of his or her office, employment, or 
agency, shall be liable to (1) a national of the 
United States .. . or (4) the legal 
representative of a [United States national] for 
personal injury or death caused by acts 
described in subsection (a)(l) of that foreign 
state, or of an official, employee, or agent of 
that foreign state, for which the courts of the 
United States may maintain jurisdiction under 
this section for money damages [which} may 
include economic damages, solatium, pain and 
suffering, and punitive damages [emphasis 
added].36 
In Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran,37 which dealt with 
a suicide bomber terror attack on a bus in the Gaza Strip in 
1995, the federal court recognized that special compensatory 
and pumt1ve damages were legitimate deterrence 
considerations since terrorism was directed not just at the 
immediate victims, but also at their family members and the 
society as a whole. Again, the goal of the terrorist is to "kill 
one and frighten ten thousand."38 
The malice associated with terrorist attacks 
transcends even that of premeditated murder. 
The intended audience of a terrorist attack is 
not limited to the families of those killed and 
wounded or even just Israelis, but in this case, 
the American public, for the purpose of 
affecting United States government support 
for Israel and the peace process. The terrorist's 
intent is to strike fear not only for one's own 
36 /d. 
37 Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F. Supp. l , 20- 33 (D.D.C. 
1998). 
38 See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
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safety, but also for that of friends and family, 
and to manipulate that fear in order to achieve 
political objectives. Thus the character of the 
wrongful act itself increases the magnitude of 
the injury. It thus demands a corresponding 
mcrease m compensation for increased 
injury.39 
In the context of pumtlve damages, the matter of 
deterrence is a central component because the goal of 
punitive damages is to create within the minds of those 
organizations and nations that sponsor terror and torture the 
realistic expectation of seizure and dissemination of assets in 
the form of large monetary damages against them. The court 
in Flatow, the case which directly prompted Congress to 
create a new statutory cause of action, set out the standard 
approach in regard to calculating punitive damages: 
Factors which may be considered in 
determining an appropriate amount of punitive 
damages may be grouped under a few broad 
headings, including: ( 1) the nature of the act 
itself, and the extent to which any civilized 
society would find that act repugnant; (2) the 
circumstances of its planning; (3) Defendants ' 
economic status with regard to the ability of 
Defendants to pay; and (4) the basis upon 
which a Court might determine the amount of 
an award reasonably sufficient to deter like 
conduct in the future, both by the Defendants 
and others.40 
Expert testimony in Flatow also led to a standard 
calculation in awarding punitive damages in an amount of 
three times the amount that the State which sponsors 
terrorism (in this case Iran) spends annually on terrorist 
39 Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F. Supp. 1, 30 (D.D.C. 
1998). 
40 !d. at 33. 
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activities. In Flatow, this multiplier produced a $300,000,000 
punitive damages award. Again, under such a calculation 
punitive awards of this magnitude are designed to: (1) deter 
State sponsors of terrorism, and (2) affect the ability of such 
nations to fund terrorist activities in the future. 
In Doe v. Rafael Saravia, 41 the court listed a string of 
similar cases which awarded amounts ranging from 
$4,000,000 to $35,000,000 in punitive and compensatory 
damages. The court in Doe noted: 
These decisions have awarded damages on the 
basis of the following factors: i. Brutality of 
the act; ii. Egregiousness of defendant's 
conduct; 111. Unavailability of criminal 
remedy; iv. International condemnation of act; 
v. Deterrence of others from committing 
similar acts; vi. Provision of redress to 
plaintiff, country and world. 42 
In Acree v. Republic of Iraq, the U.S. District Court for 
the District of Columbia not only reiterated the validity of 
punitive damages as a deterrence tool, it saw fit to award 
compensatory and punitive damages totaling over 
$959,000,000.43 In Acree, 17 American prisoners of war 
(hereinafter "POWs") during the 1991 Gulf War and their 
immediate family members sued the Republic of Iraq, its 
president, and its intelligence service, seeking compensatory 
and punitive damages for injuries suffered as a result of 
torture inflicted on the POWs while in Iraqi captivity between 
January and March 1991. In 2003, the District Court granted 
default judgment for the plaintiff POWs. In their complaint, 
"the POW plaintiffs described brutal and inhumane acts of 
physical and psychological torture suffered during their 
captivity, including severe beatings, starvation, mock 
41 Doe v. Rafael Saravia, 348 F. Supp. 2d 1112, 1158- 159 (E.D. Cal. 
2004). 
42 !d. at 1159. 
43 Acree v. Republic of Iraq, 271 F. Supp. 2d 179, 224- 25 (D.D.C. 
2003). 
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executions, dark and unsanitary living conditions, and other 
violent and shocking acts."44 
The POW plaintiffs alleged that the acts of torture set 
forth in their complaint constituted "traditional torts of 
assault, battery and intentional infliction of emotional 
distress," and requested full compensatory and punitive 
damages for each of the 17 POW plaintiffs and their family 
members. On July 7, 2003, the court entered final judgment 
in favor of the plaintiffs. Based on extensive findings of fact 
regarding the specific injuries suffered by each plaintiff, the 
federal district court awarded compensatory and punitive 
damages to all of the POW plaintiffs and their family 
members, totaling just under one billion dollars. 
Unlike the FSIA, the ATA does not specify what type of 
damages may be awarded. Further, the ATA does not clearly 
define the class of potential plaintiffs. Nevertheless, by 
allowing the "estate, survivors, or heirs" of a U.S. national 
killed by an act of terrorism to sue in federal district court and 
to recover treble damages and attorney's fees, 45 it is certain 
that the intent of the law is to maximize the punishment of the 
wrongdoer so that it is punitive in nature. In American 
jurisprudence, the purpose of allowing for treble damages is 
always punitive in nature and designed to "punish past, and to 
deter future, unlawful conduct. "46 The court used a treble 
damages formula in assessing damages against Iran. This 
approach is now standard. 
In Eisenfeld v. Islamic Republic of Iran,47 a case 
involving a 1996 Iranian State-sponsored act of terrorism 
carried out by the terror organization Hamas where a bus was 
bombed in Jerusalem, the court cited the Flatow punitive 
damages approach and awarded the two plaintiff decendents' 
estates a single award of $300,000,000 ($150,000,000 
44 Acree v. Republic of Iraq, 370 F.3d 41,44 (C.A.D.C. 2004). 
45 Crimes & Criminal Procedure, 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a) (1991). 
46 Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 
639 (1981). 
47 Eisenfeld v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 172 F. Supp. 2d I, 3- 9 
(2000). 
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each).48 In Bairn v. Quranic Literacy Institute and Hold Land 
Foundation for Relief and Development,49 the parents of a 
U.S. citizen murdered in a terror attack in Israel by the 
terrorist group Hamas sued several individuals and 
organizations for the loss of their son. They were awarded 
damages using the treble damages formula. 
Civil damages in terrorism cases provide one of the most 
effective tools imaginable in deterring international terrorism. 
Indeed, the provision of monetary damages against any 
wrongdoer along the causal chain of international terrorism 
can help drain the swamps where terrorism breeds. Under the 
FSIA and AT A, plaintiffs may expect to level judgments in 
the tens or hundreds of millions of dollars against those 
renegade States who sponsor terrorism. The twin aims of 
fully compensating victims and significantly punishing the 
financial capabilities of terrorist sponsors form the basis for 
these judgments. Under the American viewpoint, the 
egregious nature of international terrorism demands that all 
courts in all nations assess civil damages at the highest 
possible levels. As the court stated in Flatow: "As terrorism 
has achieved the status of almost universal condemnation, as 
have slavery, genocide, and piracy, the terrorist is the modern 
era's hosti humani generis-an enemy of all mankind .... "50 
Despite the development of the current American 
terrorism jurisprudence, all is not well. The inability of 
victims to recover damages once they are awarded judgment 
in court stands as a major distorter of justice and deterrence. 
In some instances, Iran, the most notorious State-sponsor of 
terrorism, has removed or hidden assets from the reaches of 
48 See also Jenco v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 154 F. Supp. 2d 27, 39 
(D.D.C. 2001) (awarding $300,000,000 in punitive damages against Iran 's 
Ministry of Information and Security); Elahi v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 
124 F. Supp. 2d 97, 114 (D.D.C. 2000) (awarding punitive damages of 
$300,000,000 against Iran's Ministry oflnformation and Security); 
Anderson v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 90 F. Supp. 2d 107, 114 (D.D.C. 
2000) (awarding punitive damages of$300,000,000 against Iran's 
Ministry of Information and Security). 
49 Boim v. Quranic Literacy Institute, 291 F.3d 1000, 1001 (7th Cir. 
2002). 
50 Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F. Supp. 1, 23 (D.D.C. 
1998). 
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American law.51 In other instances, the executive branch of 
the U.S. government has served to block recovery of assets 
under the notion that the Executive needs the flexibility to 
conduct foreign affairs. 52 
IV. PUNITIVE DAMAGES V. COMPENSATORY DAMAGES 
University of Virginia School of Law international law 
expert, Professor John Norton Moore strongly advocates that 
all nations adopt a strong legal model for civil lawsuits that 
incorporates significant punitive damages: "It is strongly in 
our interest to have every nation on earth copy the 1996 FSIA 
amendments."53 Nevertheless, Moore recognizes that 
punitive damages are not palatable to most civil law nations 
and poses a significant hurdle to developing a consensus that 
would truly hold renegade nations accountable for acts of 
terrorism committed by them or their agents. 54 Adopting an 
American-styled deterrence model that not only provides for 
citizens to be compensated for acts of terror, but also brings 
with it the hammer of punitive damages is simply unrealistic. 
If real progress is to be made toward creating a global legal 
framework which can act to effectively suppress the scourge 
of international terrorism the concept of punitive damages 
must be framed within the parameters of compensatory 
damages. 
5 1 Gabriel C. Lajeunesse, In Search of Justice: Increasing the Risk of 
Business with State Sponsors of Terror, 108 MICH. L. REv. 19 (2009) 
(discussing how Iran is able to hide its assets so that they cannot be 
attached) . 
52 See Acree v Republic of Iraq, 370 F.3d 41,50 (C.A.D.C. 2004). 
(overturning an award to plaintiffs based in part on the Executive 
Branch's contention that the court interfered with the conduct of U.S. 
foreign policy). 
53 JOHN NORTON MOORE, Introduction , in CIVIL LITIGATION 
AGAINST TERRORISM 3, 15 (John Norton Moore ed. , Carolina Academic 
Press 2004). 
54 !d. at 7 n.5. Every state on the Department of State terrorism list is 
a nondemocratic nation and, certainly, the Tali ban and AI Qaeda share 
this same anti-democratic structure. Further, there is reason to believe the 
tone of the principal factors in the aggressiveness of nondemocratic 
decision elites is their ability to reap the benefit of actions they order 
while imposing or "externalizing" the costs on others. /d. 
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In short, even if punitive damages have to be discarded in 
any attempt to develop a workable model for other 
democracies to honor judgments rendered by fellow 
democracies in terror cases, American precedents in setting 
damage awards under compensatory concepts would still 
produce meaningful and effective remedies. Since legal cases 
involving acts of terror have parallels in common law 
wrongful death and injury lawsuits, a brief overview of 
American judgments in these areas reveals that there is still 
significant punch in the compensatory arena. A reasonable 
pragmatic approach in dealing with compensatory damage 
awards would still act as a deterrent to States that support 
terrorism. Although the compensatory judgments are 
certainly not large vis a vis punitive damages, a flood of 
lawsuits wait hungrily at the door for satisfaction and would 
certainly make up for the discrepancy in short order. 
Despite the perception that American courts grant 
exorbitant awards in wrongful death cases, the amount of 
compensatory damages in most instances is both practical and 
reasonable. Even in what can be considered high-profile 
cases, the awards granted reflect a judicious approach in 
terms of just compensation for the wrongs inflicted. Four 
examples illustrate this point. First, a 2004 wrongful death 
civil lawsuit from a Texas State court dealt with a wrongful 
death claim where a wife killed her suspected cheating 
husband by intentionally hitting him with her car and then 
running the vehicle over his body multiple times. The parents 
of the victim sued the woman for wrongful death and 
received $1,858,750 each for pecuniary losses, loss of 
companionship, and mental anguish. 55 
Second, in perhaps the most infamous wrongful death suit 
in the history of the United States, the verdict against O.J. 
Simpson, though totaling $33.5 million, awarded 
compensatory damages equaling only $8.5 million. A jury 
found that defendant Orenthal James (O.J.) Simpson 
55 Harris v. Harris, No. 2004-37461 (281st Dist. Ct., Harris County, 
Tex. Feb. 9, 2007). 
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committed these homicides willfully and wrongfully, with 
oppression and malice. 56 
Third, in Rux v. Republic of Sudan, the case of the 
surviving family members of American sailors killed in the 
2000 al-Qa'eda terror attack on the U.S.S. Cole, in Yemen, a 
Virginia federal judge granted an award just under $8 million 
dollars.57 This civil action lawsuit claimed wrongful death, 
intentional infliction of emotional distress, and violations 
under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and the Death 
on the High Seas Act58 against the Republic of Sudan. The 
family members claimed that the Republic of Sudan was 
liable for damages from the attack of the U.S.S. Cole in the 
Port of Aden, Yemen, because it provided material support 
and assistance to al- Qa'eda, the terrorist organization behind 
the attack. The compensatory award was split between 33 
family members, with the amounts ranging from $471,327 to 
$117,418 each.59 
The final example returns to the most often cited 
American case dealing with compensatory damages, Flatow 
v. Islamic Republic of Iran,60 which dealt with a suicide 
bomber terror attack on a bus in the Gaza Strip in 1995. 
Flatow, and a line of cases following Flatow, set out valuable 
considerations associated with the long standing concept of 
compensatory damages in common law tort which are 
designed to compensate not just the immediate family of the 
victims, but also more remote family members. The Flatow 
court found that the vicious nature of terrorism inflicts a 
unique harm which is reflected in the resulting compensatory 
damages. 
The malice associated with terrorist attacks 
transcends even that of premeditated murder. 
The intended audience of a terrorist attack is 
not limited to the families of those killed and 
56 Rufo v. Simpson, 86 Cal. App. 4th 573, 581 (2001). 
57 Rux v. Republic of Sudan, 461 F.3d 461, 466 (4th Cir. 2006). 
58 !d. at 466-77. 
59 !d. at 469. 
60 Flatow v. Islamic Republic oflran, 999 F. Supp. 1, 20 (D.D.C. 
1998). 
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wounded or even just Israelis, but in this case, 
the American public, for the purpose of 
affecting United States government support 
for Israel and the peace process. The terrorist ' s 
intent is to strike fear not only for one's own 
safety, but also for that of friends and family, 
and to manipulate that fear in order to achieve 
political objectives. Thus the character of the 
wrongful act itself increases the magnitude of 
the injury. It thus demands a corresponding 
mcrease m compensation for increased 
injury.61 
The victim's family in Flatow was allowed to recover 
compensatory damages for economic loss, pain and suffering, 
and solatium. The court calculated economic damages by 
adding the funeral bill of $4,470.00 with the loss of 
accretions to the estate in the amount of $1,508,750.00. The 
calculation for loss of accretions took into account inflation, 
rise in productivity, job advancement, and net earnings. 
Furthermore, the court awarded $1,000,000 for the three to 
five hours of pain and suffering the victim endured after the 
terrorist attack before she died. 
The Flatow decision is also noted for its increased award 
of solatium damages which account for the additional 
suffering caused by the family members of a victim to a 
terrorist act. The court noted that "mental anguish, 
bereavement and grief resulting from the fact of decedent's 
death constitutes the preponderant element of a claim for 
solatium."62 The court then divided its solatium inquiry into 
determining: (1) the mental anguish suffered by the victim's 
family, and (2) the loss of decedent's society and comfort. 
Calculations for both of these damage types are fact intensive 
and not subject to exact models associated with economic 
loss. 
Two main factors guided the analysis for both damage 
types: (1) the expected duration of the mental anguish, and 
61 /d. at 30. 
62 !d. 
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(2) the nature of the relationship between the claimant and 
decedent. Since all acts of terrorism employ unlawful 
violence, the anguish of family members is prolonged well 
beyond what is experienced for a natural death. In turn, a 
more intimate family connection calls for greater levels of 
compensation for the victim's family member. Again, Flatow 
provides a superb standardized rubric for compensatory 
damages calculation. 
Numerous factors enter into this analysis, 
including: strong emotional ties between the 
claimant and the decedent; decedent's position 
in the family birth order relative to the 
claimant; the relative maturity or immaturity 
of the claimants; whether decedent habitually 
provided advice and solace to claimants; 
whether the claimant shared interests and 
pursuits with decedent; as well as decedent's 
achievements and plans for the future which 
would have affected claimants.63 
The inner details of any heir, parent, or sibling's 
relationship with the deceased may be uncovered to construct 
an accurate picture of the loss suffered. Another statement of 
similar factors was given for solatium in Kerr v. Islamic 
Republic of Iran: 
( 1) whether the decedent's death was sudden 
and unexpected; (2) whether the death was 
attributable to negligence or malice; (3) 
whether the claimants have sought medical 
treatment for depression and related disorders 
resulting from the decedent's death; ( 4) the 
nature (i.e. closeness) of the relationship 
between the claimant and the decedent; and 
(5) the duration of the claimant's mental 
anguish in excess of that which would have 
63 /d. at 31- 32. 
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been experienced following the decedent's 
natural death. "64 
Rooted in a common law tort framework, the AT A has no 
specific requirement that those recovering be citizens of the 
United States themselves (the statute provides no definition 
for "survivors" or "heirs"), nor does it specify the types of 
damages. Nevertheless, in light of legislative history and 
developing case law, the 2004 case of Ungar v. Palestinian 
Authority, sets the accepted methodology in determining 
these matters.65 Yaron Ungar and his wife were killed in a 
drive-by shooting by terrorists on June, 9, 1996, in Israel. 
Yaron's family brought suit under the ATA against multiple 
defendants including the Palestinian Authority. The district 
court found that Yaron's parents and siblings qualified to 
bring suit as "survivors" under the wording of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2333(a), since Congress intended to use common law tort 
principles to extend civil liability to terrorist acts with the 
widest possible effect. The use of the term "survivors" 
evidences the intent that immediate family members, other 
than heirs, may seek compensation for the loss of a loved 
one. Indeed, allowing siblings and parents of those killed by 
terrorists to recover damages serves as an additional 
deterrence factor to terrorism. 
In reference to the issue of damages, Ungar held that the 
primary purpose of the law was to empower the victims of 
terrorism to the fullest extent possible. Accordingly, Ungar 
allowed for the full range of damages set out under the FSIA. 
Ungar's two children (heirs), parents, and siblings were all 
awarded damages for loss of society and companionship. The 
children also recovered for loss of parental guidance and 
parental services which Ungar could no longer provide. 
"These services include such tasks as babysitting, feeding, 
bathing, doing the laundry, getting them ready for school, and 
similar assistance normally performed by a parent for a 
64 Kerr v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 245 F. Supp. 2d 59, 64 (D.D.C. 
2003). 
65 Estates of Ungar ex ref. Strachman v. Palestinian Authority , 304 F. 
Supp. 2d 232 (D.R.I. 2004). 
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child."66 Economic damages will ordinarily include loss of 
earnings and funeral costs. Similar to Flatow, where the court 
considered inflation, rise in productivity, job advancement, 
and net earnings in its calculations of lost earnings, the Ungar 
family recovered lost earnings subject to Ungar's personal 
consumption. 
Understanding that no rigid formula exists for computing 
damages associated with pain and suffering, the Ungar court 
heard expert testimony giving a step-by-step analysis of the 
drive-by shooting to accurately determine damages for pain 
and suffering. The court considered in its calculation the fact 
that Ungar suffered painful bullet wounds in his arm and 
chest before being killed by a head shot while slumped in his 
car seat, as well as the mental pain Ungar experienced at 
seeing his wife's death shortly before his own. The court 
awarded $500,000 ·for the pain and suffering. In addition, 
Ungar's family received losses for mental anguish (solatium) 
which were calculated in a similar fashion to loss of society. 
Ungar's children, parents and three siblings received a total 
of $38,803,401 in compensatory damages for all the above 
mentioned losses. 
Jenco v. Islamic Republic of Iran67 provides additional 
guidance for appropriate compensatory damages. Father 
Lawrence M. Jenco was a Catholic priest working in Beirut, 
Lebanon when he was taken hostage by the terrorist 
organization Hezbollah. After a year and a half of 
maltreatment he was released. Father Jenco and his family 
sued Hizbollah and the government of Iran which funds the 
terrorist organization. Father Jenco recovered for torts of 
battery, assault, false imprisonment, and intentional infliction 
of emotional distress. The court broke with traditional 
doctrine when it allowed Father Jenco's immediate family to 
recover for intentional infliction of emotional distress 
although they were not physically present to see the 
outrageous and abusive conduct of his captors. The Jenco 
court referenced the reasoning of the court in Sutherland v. 
66 /d. at 274. 
67 Jenco v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 154 F. Supp. 2d 27 (D.D.C. 
2001). 
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The Islamic Republic of Iran, which stated that "when an 
organization takes someone hostage, it is implicitly intending 
to cause emotional distress among the members of that 
hostage's immediate family."68 The Jenco court also adopted 
the precedent established in Cicippio v. Islamic Republic of 
Iran, 69 of awarding ten thousand dollars a day to plaintiffs 
who were taken hostage. That formula made for a damage 
award of $24,540,000 for Jenco. 
V . PROPOSING AN INTERNATIONAL PROTOCOL FOR CIVIL 
L!TIGA TION AGAINST TERRORISM 
Many of the world's civil legal systems differ 
substantially from the United States' civil legal system. 70 
Nevertheless, in the realm of compensating victims of 
terrorism, the American approach has much to contribute. Of 
paramount importance, the American perspective centers on 
the desire to provide solid legal mechanisms for American 
terror victims to file private causes of action against both 
those who commit international acts of terror and those States 
who contribute to or stand behind those attacks. As briefly 
outlined above, in addition to standard tort remedies, the 
United States has codified traditional tort causes of action in 
terms of fixed legislation. 
The next step in the process of developing civil litigation 
as a viable tool to fight terror is to propose for adoption a 
United Nations protocol that will allow State Parties to honor 
damage awards in terrorism civil litigation suits rendered by 
other State Parties. In his 2010 book, Legal Issues in the 
Struggle Against Terror, John Norton Moore offers such a 
draft protocol. Disregarding the punitive damages set out in 
American legislation, Moore provides the following at 
proposed Article 11 : 
68 Sutherland v. The Islamic Republic of Iran, 151 F. Supp. 2d 27, 50 
(D.D.C. 2001). 
69 Cicippio v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 18 F. Supp. 2d 62 (D.C.C. 
1998). 
70 See, e. g., Gonzales v. Chrysler Corp., 31 F.3d 377 (5th Cir. 2002) 
(comparing the Mexican law caps on wrongful death with American law). 
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States Parties to this Protocol undertake to 
honor in their national legal systems 
judgments rendered by other States Parties 
under actions established consistent with this 
Protocol provided; 
• A judge of the honoring State Party 
reviews the foreign judgment and 
determines that the judgment was fair and 
consistent with due process of law; 
• No State Party is required to honor 
damage awards, such as those for punitive 
damages, which are inconsistent with its 
own national law; and 
• No attachment or execution shall be 
permitted against facilities protected by 
diplomatic or counselor immunity, military 
assets, or assets held by national central 
banks [emphasis added].71 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The so-called War on Terror requires the use of all 
available legal tools and the application of the power of the 
civil justice system represents a vastly underutilized potential 
of great impact. Understanding that international tort law has 
been around for centuries, it is imperative that the 
democracies of the international community take direct steps 
to capitalize on this essential legal tool as a weapon against 
terrorist States. Totalitarian regimes like Iran and North 
Korea are the ones that are guilty of supporting terrorism and 
have too long been able to conceal huge financial assets 
within the borders and reach of many of the world's 
democratic States. 
Chief among the arguments against adopting an 
American-style civil action framework is the concern over 
71 JOHN NORTON MOORE, Civil Litigation Against Terrorism: 
Neglected Promise, in LEGAL ISSUES IN THE STRUGGLE AGAINST TERROR 
197, 233 (John Norton Moore & Robert F. Turner eds., Carolina 
Academic Press 2004 ). 
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punitive damages. Since punitive damages are generally not 
available in civil law systems and are very controversial in 
international practice, a proposed international protocol must 
limit damages to compensatory only. As discussed under 
Section V of this article, the use of compensatory damages 
would still deliver a significant blow to States that sponsor 
terrorism, particularly if the full range of compensation is 
provided. 
A new United Nations convention on civil causes of 
action against States that sponsor terrorists would have as its 
key component an obligation on State parties to enact 
legislation to permit civil suits and honor the judgments 
issued by other States. Not only would the civil litigation 
serve as permanent record of the terror act established by a 
competent court- an official record of condemnation-the 
damages awarded would serve as deterrence to the 
machinations of the State that sponsored the terrorism. 
At the end of the day, civil lawsuits are also intended to 
bring public shame within the international community to 
those nations who sponsor acts of terror. Since terrorist acts 
have long been criminalized in every democratically-based 
legal system as well as in numerous United Nations 
sponsored conventions, 72 it is essential that all democracies 
take the next step and develop a legal framework where the 
terror judgments of other democracies are given reciprocity. 
72 G.A. Res. 109, U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess. , Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc 
A/54/49 (Vol. I) (1999). 
